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I. INTRODUCTION
Since deciding Romer v. Evans in 1996,' the United States
Supreme Court has been on a collision course with itself over the
issue of constitutional protection from discrimination for lesbians
and gay men. In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 the Court dis-
missed the argument that laws prohibiting sodomy violated the
due process privacy rights of gay men.3 In Romer, however, the
Court determined that a state could not, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, treat lesbians and gay men differently from
other citizens based merely on public disapproval. 4 The absence of
any protection under the Due Process Clause on the one hand, and
a fairly stringent restriction of state action against lesbians and
gay men based on equal protection on the other, created a tension
in constitutional doctrine. That tension reached a breaking point
in Lawrence v. Texas.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. See id. at 192-96.
4. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-36.
5. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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In Lawrence, the constitutionality of the Texas anti-sodomy
law, known as the Homosexual Conduct Act (the Act), was chal-
lenged on the bases of both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 6 The Act criminalized deviate sexual intercourse between
individuals of the same sex.7 According to Texas law, deviate sex-
ual intercourse was defined as:
(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another person; or
(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object.8
John Lawrence and his partner Tyron Garner were arrested
and convicted for violating the Act when police entered Lawrence's
apartment on a false report of a weapons disturbance. 9 The consti-
tutionality of the Act was challenged in a Texas county criminal
court; that challenge failed. 10 The Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth Division also rejected the constitutional claims of the
defendants." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and issued a decision on June 26, 2003.12
In a dramatic and somewhat unexpected decision, Justice
Kennedy, writing for a five justice majority, declared that the
Homosexual Conduct Act violated the Due Process Clause and
overruled Bowers.' 3 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor,
while disagreeing with the overruling of Bowers, argued that the
Texas Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.14 In merely seventeen years, the Court had moved
from a dismissive rejection of the argument that anti-sodomy laws
violated due process privacy rights, to an expansive protection of
the right of lesbians and gay men to conduct their sexual lives as
they wish without governmental intrusion. 5 In this essay, I de-
scribe the Court's journey from Bowers to Lawrence and briefly
6. Id. at 2476.
7. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
8. Id. § 21.01(1)(A)-(B).
9. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
10. Id. at 2476.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2484.
14. Id.
15. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, with Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
suggest some reasons for this significant change in constitutional
doctrine.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN BOWERS AND ROMER
Relying on the privacy rights established in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,16 Eisenstadt v. Baird17 and Roe v. Wade,18 the petitioners
in Bowers v. Hardwick argued that the Georgia statute criminaliz-
ing sodomy encroached upon a private and intimate association
that was protected from state intrusion by the Due Process
Clause. 19 This argument was rejected by a five justice majority, 20
who declared that there was no "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."2' The zone of privacy created by the Due
Process Clause was limited to "family, marriage, and procrea-
tion,"22 and thus had no bearing on the right of gay couples to en-
gage in sodomy.23 The Court found the proposition that the Due
Process Clause shielded "any kind of private sexual conduct be-
tween consenting adults" from state intrusion, "unsupportable."24
The Court's opinion also turned on its conclusion that the
right to engage in sodomy was not "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."25 The fundamental rights protected by the Due Process
Clause, reasoned the Court, did not extend to freedom to engage in
same-sex sodomy since that freedom did not have a long history of
protection from government intrusion.26 The Court reviewed the
history of state laws criminalizing sodomy and found an extensive
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
20. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor. Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 187.
21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. The Georgia statute at issue in Bowers
criminalized both same-sex and different-sex sodomy. Id at 188 n.1. The de-
fendant was a man charged with committing sodomy with another man. Id.
at 187-88. The Bowers Court chose to frame the issue before it as limited to
the constitutionality of criminalizing same-sex sodomy. Id at 190.
22. Id. at 191.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 191-92, 194.
26. Id. at 192-94.
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history of criminal penalties for sodomy.2 7 At the time of the Bow-
ers decision, twenty-five states had criminal laws against sod-
omy.28 Finding that the proscription against sodomy had "ancient
roots," the Court proceeded to review colonial and early American
criminal sodomy laws, arriving at a similar conclusion.29
The Court made short work of the petitioner's argument that
moral approbation was not a sufficient basis to support Georgia's
anti-sodomy law.30 Stating that law "is constantly based on no-
tions of morality," the Court upheld Georgia's ability to express is
disapproval of homosexuality through its sodomy laws.31
In a sharply worded dissent, written by Justice Blackmun,
four of the justices criticized the majority's narrow framing of the
issue and declared the case was about "the right to be let alone."32
The constitutional right to privacy, the dissent asserted, "means
that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices
about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more
than assert that the choice they have made is an 'abominable
crime not fit to be named among Christians."'33 They believed that
the Georgia statute violated the fundamental privacy interest pro-
tecting an individual's intimate associations with others.34 The
dissenting justices concluded that in light of the fundamental lib-
erty interest, Georgia's justifications for the anti-sodomy statute
were inadequate. 35 In an analogy to Loving v. Virginia,36 the dis-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 196. The Court also rejected the argument that conduct that
occurs in the privacy of the home should be entitled to additional protection.
Id. at 195-96.
29. Id. at 192-93.
30. Id. at 196.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 199-200 (quoting Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (Ga. 1904)).
33. Id. (quoting Herring, 46 S.E. at 882).
34. Id. at 206. The privacy right described by the dissent flowed from
previous due process cases such as, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). The right described in those cases as inherent in the due process
guarantee is the promise that "a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of the government." Bowers, 478 U.S. at
203 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
35. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state miscegenation laws violate equal
protection and due process rights).
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sent argued that moral or social disapproval alone is not sufficient
justification to overcome a fundamental liberty interest; some
secular justification, beyond moral approbation, would be neces-
sary for the anti-sodomy statute to survive. 37 As the justices ex-
plained, "the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere
to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest, let
alone an interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and
minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently."38
Eleven years later, in Romer v. Evans, the Court was faced
with the issue of whether a Colorado constitutional amendment
that repealed state and local anti-discrimination law based on
sexual orientation and prohibited any government action protect-
ing lesbians and gay men from discrimination was constitu-
tional.39 The Court invalidated the amendment as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.40 Quoting from Justice Harlen's dis-
sent in the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Kennedy an-
nounced that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes
among its citizens."41 In stirring language, Justice Kennedy re-
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens analyzed the Georgia law as
applying to both gay and straight sexual partners based on the immorality of
the sexual act of sodomy and concluded that "the fact that a governing major-
ity in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." Id. at 216
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also concluded that selective en-
forcement of the sodomy law against only same-sex couples could not be justi-
fied. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). The Colorado constitutional amendment
provided that:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or de-
partments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination. ...
Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, 30(b)).
40. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
41. Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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nounced the Colorado amendment as antithetical to our country's
constitutional tradition and a "denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense."42
Equal protection, at a minimum, requires that a governmen-
tal decision to treat one group differently from another bear a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate end.43 The Court found that the
Colorado amendment failed this requirement because its goals
were insufficiently related to the broad sweep of the amendment,44
and because the goal of politically disadvantaging a group - gay
men and lesbians - was not a legitimate basis for governmental
action.45 Because the fit between the goals of the amendment and
the means employed to accomplish them was so loose, the Court
concluded that the real motivation behind the amendment was a
desire to harm lesbians and gay men.46 The Amendment "classi-
fie[d] homosexuals[,] not to further a proper legislative end[,] but
to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.
A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."47
The Court in Romer pointedly failed to discuss Bowers and
the conflict created by the two decisions. This omission and the
contradiction between Bowers and Romer was a central point of
the dissenting opinion. 48 As Justice Scalia pointed out, "[i]f it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual con-
duct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State
to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." 49 A
state's ability to criminalize gay sodomy, established in Bowers,
provided the rational basis to justify the Colorado amendment. 50
42. Id. at 633.
43. Id. at 631.
44. The stated goals of the amendment were to protect citizens' freedom
of association by not requiring those who found homosexuality offensive to
rent or sell homes to, or employ lesbians and gay men. Another justification
for the amendment was to preserve state and local anti-discrimination re-
sources for the benefit of other minorities. Id. at 635.
45. Id. at 632.
46. "The sheer breadth [of the amendment] is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legiti-
mate state interests." Id. at 632.
47. Id. at 635.
48. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Concluding that the Court majority, in finding the constitutional
amendment invalid, had taken sides in the culture wars, Justice
Scalia stated that the Court "employ[ed] a constitutional theory
heretofore unknown to frustrate Colorado's reasonable effort to
preserve traditional American moral values."51
III. UNEXPECTED RESOLUTION: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
In a bold move, the Court in Lawrence resolved the tension
between Romer and Bowers by overruling Bowers.52 Finding the
right asserted by the petitioners to fall squarely into the liberty
and privacy interests guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, the
Court stated that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that in-
cludes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct."53 Finding that Bowers defined the scope of liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution too narrowly, the Court concluded that
homosexuals have the right to choose to enter into a personal rela-
tionship, involving sexual intimacy "without being punished as
criminals." 54
The Court stated that Bowers was wrong in 1986 and was
wrong in 2003.55 The flaw in Bowers was, in part, its too narrow
conception of the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, in addition to the majority's inaccurate reading of the his-
torical record concerning sodomy prosecution. The long history of
condemnation of homosexual sodomy, relied upon in Bowers, was
more complex and ambiguous than the Court had suggested.56 Ad-
ditionally, the Court failed to reference the recent trend, both in
the United States and abroad, in the last half-century toward the
51. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
53. Id. at 2475. In describing the scope of the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause, the Court relied on Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade. Id. at 2476-77. In Bowers, these cases had
been distinguished as concerning only marriage and reproduction. 478 U.S.
at 190-91.
54. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
55. Id. at 2484.
56. Id. at 2480. For example, the Bowers Court had failed to note the sig-
nificance of the ALI Model Penal Code promulgated in 1955, which did not
recommend any sanctions for consensual sexual relations. Id. Nor did the
Bowers Court take into account the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights that found laws criminalizing gay consensual sex a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 2481.
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liberalization of laws regarding sexual practices. 57 The Lawrence
Court also pointed to developments since the Bowers decision call-
ing into question its conclusions about the broad condemnation of
sodomy.58 Of the twenty-five states that outlawed sodomy in 1986,
only thirteen continued to do so in June 2003 and only four of
those maintained laws applying only to same-sex sodomy.59
Of significant concern to the Lawrence Court was the stigma
the Texas sodomy statute imposed on lesbians and gay men, de-
spite the very few criminal prosecutions for violation of the stat-
ute.60 As I have discussed in an earlier work, the most significant
harm caused by anti-sodomy statutes is not actual criminal prose-
cution, but rather the use of the laws in other legal contexts. 61 The
Court in Lawrence noted that "[wihen homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimina-
tion both in the public and in the private spheres."62 The fact that
a lesbian or gay man can be regarded as a law-breaker in states
that outlaw sodomy works to disadvantage lesbians and gay men
in employment, child custody, and other significant civil legal con-
texts.
Concluding that Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers should
have been followed, the Court stated, "The petitioners [were] enti-
tled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime."63 While explicitly attempting to prevent
expansion of the holding to same-sex marriage or to sexual acts
involving minors or those who may be intimidated into consent,
prostitution or public conduct,64 the Lawrence Court expanded the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2482.
61. See Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litiga-
tion, 79 TEX. L. REV. 813 (2001).
62. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
63. Id. at 2484.
64. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia questions the limits to the
reach of the opinion set forth by Justice Kennedy:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that
has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is con-
cerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legiti-
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zone of privacy protected by the Due Process Clause to cover con-
sensual sexual acts by adults, both gay and straight.
While declaring that an equal protection challenge to the
Texas statute was "tenable,"5 the majority opinion rested its con-
clusions on due process doctrine.66 In her concurrence, however,
Justice O'Connor concluded that she would have struck down the
statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.67 Declining
to overrule Bowers, Justice O'Connor nonetheless concluded that
treating same sex and different sex couples differently could not
satisfy the rational basis requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause.68 Following Romer, Justice O'Connor argued that the
Texas law was invalid because it was based solely on moral disap-
proval and, "like a bare desire to harm the group, [moral disap-
proval] is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy the rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause."6 9
mate state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if,
as the Court coos... , "[wihen sexuality finds overt expression in in-
timate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one ele-
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring," what justification
could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homo-
sexual couples exercising "[tihe liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion"?
Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 2482.
66. Id. at 2476, 2484.
67. Id. at 2486.
68. Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Bowers and in her
concurrence found a way to reconcile Bowers with her determination that the
Texas Act was unconstitutional:
In Bowers, we held that a state law criminalizing sodomy as applied
to homosexual couples did not violate substantive due process. We
rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the
law, pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality.
The only question in front of the Court in Bowers was whether the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protected a right
to engage in homosexual sodomy. Bowers did not hold that moral
disapproval of a group is a rational basis under the Equal Protection
Clause to criminalize homosexual sodomy when heterosexual sod-
omy is not punished.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
69. Id.
57320041
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IV. WHAT HAPPENED?
On the most basic level, part of the explanation for the turn
around in due process doctrine represented by Lawrence was a
change in Court personnel. In 2003, the only Justices in the ma-
jority in Bowers remaining on the Court were Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor. Furthermore, one of the Justices in the majority,
Justice Powell, had publicly questioned the correctness of the de-
cision in Bowers.70 But perhaps the most significant personnel
change for the evolution of due process doctrine in this area was
the arrival of Justice Kennedy in 1988. Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice O'Connor were the key votes in determining the outcome in
Lawrence. Justice O'Connor was willing to distinguish the holding
in Bowers. And, as the author of the Romer opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy had already made clear his willingness to interpret constitu-
tional rights broadly to protect the interests of lesbians and gay
men. Perhaps he argued for the overruling of Bowers at that point,
but, lacking sufficient support, instead pursued an equal protec-
tion analysis without reference to Bowers.71 The same six Justices
in the Romer majority held the Texas statute unconstitutional in
Lawrence, and perhaps Justice Kennedy's leadership on this issue
partly explains the six person support for striking down the Texas
law. 72
Perhaps another explanation for the change in the Court's
view on anti-sodomy law has been the increasing social and cul-
ture acceptance and integration of lesbians and gay men since
1986. The repeal of many states' sodomy laws in the past seven-
teen years may also reflect a strengthening of the view that the
70. Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 359, 417 (2001).
71. The Justices on the Court when Romer and Lawrence were decided
were the same.
72. Justice Kennedy, a Reagan appointee, has authored several "liberal"
opinions. He has been willing to break ranks with the more conservative
Reagan and Bush appointees. Richard Brust, The Man in the Middle: Justice
Kennedy ' Opinion in the Gay Rights Case Underlines His Growing Influence,
A.B.A. J., October 2003, at 24. Laurence Tribe suggests that even at the time
of his appointment to the Court, it was clear that "with someone like Ken-
nedy on the Court, the eventual overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick was nearly
a foregone conclusion .... ." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fun-
damental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893,
1954 (2004).
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government should not interfere with consensual adult sex acts. 73
If the Due Process Clause is the repository of our shared cultural
sense of justice and liberty, an evolution in shared views of sexual
morality may well influence the Court's decisions. This social
change since Bowers was noted by the Lawrence Court as being
part of the basis for its conclusion that the liberty interests cre-
ated by the Due Process Clause included the formation of gay and
lesbian sexual relationships.7 4
Jeffrey Rosen has argued that the Court's decision in Law-
rence may well result in a backlash against lesbian and gay rights,
particularly in the area of gay marriage, thus slowing or even re-
versing the advance of lesbian and gay equality.75 Whether Law-
rence is the harbinger of a more tolerant era or becomes a symbol
of resistance depends in large part on courts' use of Lawrence in
cases involving same-sex marriage, prostitution, bigamy, adultery
and other currently outlawed or unrecognized sexual relation-
ships. The doctrinal shift from Romer's equal protection analysis
to Lawrence's prohibition of anti-sodomy laws on the basis of due
process is not hard to trace. What is more difficult to see is where
the limits of Lawrence will be drawn.
V. LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Less than six months after the Lawrence decision, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the pro-
hibition of same-sex marriage violated the state's constitutional
liberty and equality protections.7 6 While observing that the Mas-
73. One author has suggested that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's
report on the President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky sexual relationship has
helped foster discussion and acceptance of non-traditional sex acts. Debbie
Nathan, Sodomy for the Masses, THE NATION, Apr. 19, 1999, at 21-22.
74. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481, 2482. Since Bowers, twelve of the
twenty-five states that outlawed sodomy have repealed their laws, and in
those states where the laws remain, they are generally not enforced. Id. at
2481. In addition, criticism of Bowers has been extensive, and other countries
have recognized the right of gay men and lesbians to engage in intimate sex-
ual conduct. Id. at 2483.
75. Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 7, 2003, at 49. Rosen argues that, as with the abortion issue in Roe, the
Court's insertion of itself into the culture wars actually creates resistance to
the rights the Court is attempting to protect. Id.
76. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass.
2003).
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sachusetts' constitutional protections for individual liberty were
more extensive than those in the U.S. Constitution, the court
nonetheless referred to the reasoning in Lawrence when it con-
cluded that the discrimination faced by lesbians and gay men who
are denied the right to marry because of their sexual orientation
violates liberty and due process rights. 77 The court observed, "Re-
cently the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the
Constitution prohibits a State from wielding its formidable power
to regulate conduct in a manner that demeans basic human dig-
nity, even though that statutory discrimination may enjoy broad
public support." s Despite Justice Kennedy's assertion that the
Lawrence decision "does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual per-
sons seek to enter,"79 it is clear from Goodridge that Lawrence has
been and will be used to advance the argument that banning
same-sex marriage violates due process and equal protection
rights. 0
In Goodridge, the court reasoned that the state lacked a le-
gitimate reason for excluding same-sex couples from the benefits
of civil marriage and that without such a legitimate basis, the ex-
clusion violated both equal protection and due process rights.81
The bases asserted by the state for excluding same-sex couples
from civil marriage - "providing a favorable setting for procrea-
tion; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing.., and pre-
serving scarce State and private financial resources," - failed to
provide a rational basis for the state's action.8 2 The court con-
cluded that in the absence of any rational basis for the exclusion of
same-sex couples, the bar seemed to be based on "persistent
77. Id. at 958-59. In contrast to the Goodridge decision, the Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona in Standhart v. Superior Court concluded that, notwith-
standing the Lawrence decision, same sex marriage was not a fundamental
right under either the federal or Arizona constitutions. 77 F.3d 451 (2003).
78. Id. at 958 n.17.
79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
80. Laurence Tribe argues in his recent essay that the Court's reasoning
in Lawrence will inevitably lead to a determination that banning same-sex
marriage violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Tribe, su-
pra note 72, at 1945-46.
81. 798 N.E.2d at 961.
82. Id. The court also rejected the assertions that including same-sex
couples in civil marriage would "trivialize or destroy the institution of mar-
riage." Id. at 965.
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prejudices against persons who are ... homosexual."8 3 Such dis-
approval or prejudice was not an adequate basis for denying lesbi-
ans and gay men the right to marry.84 The Massachusetts court's
reasoning echoes the assertion in Lawrence that "the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice." 5 If disapproval of homosexuality is not a
constitutionally permissible basis for a state to condemn same sex
sodomy, it seems unlikely that the same disapproval could sustain
a ban against same-sex marriage.86
VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamental change in due process and equal protection doc-
trine is revealed in the changes in the Court's analysis from Bow-
ers, to Romer, and concluding in Lawrence. In these three cases,
we can see the effect of changing social values, the result of su-
preme court appointments and resignations, and the different in-
sights revealed by a different framing of the issues. The full
ramifications of Lawrence remain unclear, but in addition to the
new privacy protections it may provide, the decision stands as a
compelling example of how constitutional doctrine evolves and
how the Supreme Court struggles with and attempts to resolve
critical issues of individual rights.
83. Id. at 968.
84. Id.
85. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
86. Lawrence Tribe suggests that while the Lawrence reasoning must in-
evitably lead to the demise of bans on same-sex marriage, the process of the
Court reaching that conclusion may well take many years. Tribe, supra note
72, at 1947.
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